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WHEN TWO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS COLLIDE AT THE
PHARMACY: THE STRUGGLE TO BALANCE THE
CONSUMER'S RIGHT TO ACCESS CONTRACEPTION AND
THE PHARMACIST'S RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE.
By Suzanne Davis & Paul Lansing'
I. INTRODUCTION
The dangerous intersection between a pharmacist's right of moral belief
and a woman's right of contraceptive use continues to be an important
topic for debate across the nation. In fact, the area of contraceptive
rights has been a controversial issue since the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, which recognized
a constitutional right of privacy in family planning decisions implicit
within the meaning of the Bill of Rights. Now, over forty years since
this landmark decision, courts continue to grapple with the notion of
women's rights and how contraceptive use should be protected.
New developments in pharmaceutical research and technology
have resulted in the formation of new legal and ethical issues. The
most recent dilemma faced by both federal and state courts features
women who desire a recently FDA approved contraceptive drug called
Plan B and pharmacists who are morally opposed to the mode of action
of the drug. This newfound ability to prevent birth using a drug taken
after sexual activity presents a scenario the Griswold Court would have
never anticipated. Nonetheless, the precedent beginning with Griswold
has created a necessary collision between these two fundamental rights.
Pharmacists are placed in a unique position in this controversy.
Pharmacists are licensed by the state yet some believe that they cannot
comply with state requirements due to their individual religious beliefs.
As nearly all Americans are familiar, the right to religious belief has
been protected since the drafting of the Bill of Rights in the First
Amendment. Consequently, many pharmacists, who are opposed to
Plan B, think the government should not be allowed to interfere with
their business and ethical decision to refuse to dispense the drug. As
Illinois State Senator and Pharmacist/Pharmacy Owner, Frank Watson,
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states: "It's an infringement on a business decision and also on the
pharmacist's right of conscience."
2
II. BACKGROUND
Although government action on this issue is occurring
nationwide, we have chosen to use an Illinois court case, Morr-Fitz v.
Blagojevich, to exemplify the problem because the Illinois "Duty to
Dispense" law analyzed in the case has been referred to as an
appropriate template for the balance of pharmacist and patient rights.
3
The case is currently under review by the Illinois Supreme Court, as the
Court heard arguments on March 18, 2008, and a decision is expected
soon.
4
In this case, the Plaintiffs allege having moral and religious
objections to dispensing the "Morning After Pill", also known as
emergency contraception or Plan B because they believe that life
begins at conception and the drug can prevent a fertilized egg from
implanting in the uterus.5 Although the plaintiffs have not yet been
confronted with a consumer demanding an emergency contraception
prescription be filled, they currently seek declaratory judgment from
the Supreme Court to prevent suffering hardship from Blagojevich's
emergency order.
6
Governor Blagojevich made the "Duty to Dispense" emergency
order on April 1, 2005 in response to several consumer complaints that
pharmacists were refusing to fill their valid prescriptions based on the
pharmacist's religious beliefs about the drug. The emergency rule, that
subsequently became permanent by legislative committee approval,
requires Illinois Pharmacists to fill all valid prescriptions for
2 Monica Davey & Pam Belluck, Pharmacies Balk on After-Sex Pill and Widen Fight
in Many States, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/19/national! 19pill.html.
3 Sarah Tomkowiak, Reconciling Principles and Prescriptions: Do Pharmacist
Refusal Clauses Strike the Appropriate Balance Between Pharmacists' and Patients'
Rights?, 4 U. ILL. L. REv. 1329, 1353 (2007).
4 Illinois Courts website, Illinois Supreme Court Docket page,
http://www.state.il.us/COURT/SupremeCourt/Docket/2008/03-08.pdf.
5 Morr-Fitz v. Blagojevich, 867 N.E.2d 1164, 1165 (I11. App. Ct. 2007).
6 Illinois Courts website, Illinois Supreme Court Oral Arguments video of Plaintiff's
oral arguments,
http://163.191.183.117/court/SupremeCourt/Video/2008/031808_104692.wmv.
7 Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992, 996 (C.D. I11. 2006).
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contraceptives, including emergency contraception. Specifically, the
administrative rule states as follows.
"Duty of Division I Pharmacy to Dispense
Contraceptives: 1) Upon receipt of a valid, lawful
prescription for a contraceptive, a pharmacy must dispense
the contraceptive, or a suitable alternative permitted by the
prescriber, to the patient or the patient's agent without
delay, consistent with normal timeframe for filling any
other prescription. If the contraceptive, or a suitable
alternative, is not in stock, the pharmacy must obtain the
contraceptive under the pharmacy's standard procedures for
ordering contraceptive drugs not in stock, including the
procedures of any entity that is affiliated with, owns, or
franchises the pharmacy. However, if the patient prefers,
the prescription must be transferred to a local pharmacy of
the patient's choice under the pharmacy's standard
procedures for transferring prescriptions for contraceptive
drugs, including the procedures of any entity that is
affiliated with, owns, or franchises the pharmacy. Under
any circumstances an unfilled prescription for contraceptive
drugs must be returned to the patient if the patient so
directs. 2) For the purposes of this subsection (j), the term
'contraceptive' shall refer to all FDA-approved drugs or
devices that prevent pregnancy."
9
The Illinois Department of Professional Regulation has made it
clear that non-compliance with the new rule will not be tolerated. A
spokesman for the state agency said in response to a fine against a St.
Charles Illinois Osco Pharmacy for $37,500 for its failure to dispense
Plan B emergency contraception in 2006: "This is a significant fine.
It's important pharmacies understand that we intend to vigorously
enforce this rule." 10 Not complying can even result in the suspension of
8 29 Ill. Reg. 5586 (Apr. 15, 2005); see also ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, §
1330.910)(2008)
9 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1330.91(j), amended by 29 Il. Reg. 13639, 13663
(Aug., 25, 2005).
10 Gala M. Pierce, Osco Hit with Fine, DAILY HERALD, January 12, 2006, at 1,
available at http://www.dailyherald.com/search/searchstory.asp?id=142048.
2009]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
a pharmacy's license as well as the license of that site's chief
pharmacist. "1
Consequently, the gravity of this issue is clear. On one hand,
pharmacists across the state have lost their jobs for their failure to
dispense the drug. For example, four Walgreens pharmacists were put
on indefinite unpaid leave for refusing to fill emergency contraception
prescriptions) 2 Other pharmacists have been fired or denied
promotions because of their refusal to dispense the drug.' 3 Others such
as Luke Vander Bleek, one of the Plaintiffs in the Morr-Fitz case, seek
declaratory judgment to determine whether he will be able to practice
his profession while holding firm to his moral beliefs. 14 If the Illinois
Supreme Court rules against conscience protection, Vander Bleek
recognizes he may be forced, due to his religious beliefs, to close the
doors of his pharmacy and move to a different state or quit pharmacy
altogether. 15
On the other hand, consumers with valid prescriptions have
been denied by pharmacies to have their prescriptions filled. This was
Governor Blagojevich's concern when he announced the emergency
order. He commented: "[A few weeks earlier] two women called in
prescriptions to their local pharmacy in the South Loop [downtown
Chicago] to purchase contraceptives. Each woman had a prescription
from her doctor. Both women only sought to buy contraceptives yet
both were denied. Why? Because the pharmacist refused to fill the
prescription [sic]. Unfortunately, this story is not unique to Chicago or
to Illinois. Cases like this have been popping up all over the country.
It's happened in Wisconsin, Texas, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Ohio, California, and in other states around the country.
16
Subsequently at a press conference announcing the new law, the
Governor added that: "those involved in this effort may be getting away
l Jim Suhr, Four Walgreen Pharmacists Disciplined for Not Filling Contraceptives,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 2005 available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/12/0 1/walgreensplaces_4_pharma
cists on leave/.
121d.
13 Bruce D. White, DRUGS, ETHICS, AND QUALITY OF LIFE: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY DILEMMAS IN MEDICINE AND PHARMACY
PRACTICE 86 (The Haworth Press, Inc. 2007).
141d.
15 Interview with Luke Vander Bleek, Plaintiff in Morr-Fitz v. Blagojevich, 867
N.E.2d 1164 (I11. App. Ct. 2007)(No. 4-05-1050), May 15, 2008. (on file with author).
16 WHITE, supra note 12, at 86.
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with this in other states, but here in Illinois, we are not going to let that
happen."
17
A. The Illinois "Duty to Dispense" Rule
Basically, the rule states that upon receipt of a valid, lawful
prescription for a contraceptive, which is defined as all FDA-approved
drugs or devices that prevent pregnancy, a pharmacy must dispense the
contraceptive, or a suitable alternative permitted by the prescriber, to
the patient or the patient's agent without delay, consistent with the
normal timeframe for filling any other prescription. 18 If the drug is not
in stock, the pharmacy must obtain the contraceptive under the
pharmacy's standard procedures for ordering contraceptive drugs not in
stock. 19 However, if the patient prefers, the prescription must be
transferred to a local pharmacy of the patient's choice, under the
pharmacy's standard 2procedures for transferring prescriptions for
contraceptive drugs.2  Under any circumstances, an unfilled
prescription for contraceptive drugs must be returned to the patient if
the patient so directs.21 However, the rule does allow for clinical
opinions of the pharmacist. 22 Thus, the rule will not interfere with a
pharmacist's screening for potential drug therapy problems permitted
by another Illinois statute, 225 ILCS 85/3 (q).23 Consequently, if a
pharmacist in Illinois refuses to fill a contraception prescription due to
his religious beliefs only, then that pharmacist is breaking the Illinois
"Duty to Dispense" law and subjects his pharmacy to liability under the
rule.
Although the "Duty to Dispense" rule in Illinois began as an
emergency executive order, Governor Blagojevich filed with the Joint
Committee on Administrative Rules to make the rule permanent.
2 4
After the review process, the administrative committee approved the
rule.25 However, after the Illinois Pharmacists Association complained
17 id.
'8 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, §1330.91(j)(April 18, 2005)
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id
22 See generally id.
23 Id.
24 News Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Moves to Make Emergency
Contraceptives Rule Permanent (Apr. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=3862.
25 Id.
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the rule would violate the Illinois Practice Act, Governor Blagojevich
26
amended the rule to its current version. 26 Since the rule was not voted
on by the entire legislature, legislative history on the rule is non-
existent. However, the Governor's public comments do give some
insight as to why he personally felt the rule was necessary. For
example, although the Illinois rules do not appear to target any one type
of contraceptive, the Governor made it clear by his public statements
that the rule was intended to coerce compliance by pharmacists who
have religious objections to emergency contraception also known as the
"morning after pill."' 27 The Governor acknowledged that the rule was
made in response to the actions of pharmacists across the state that
declined to fill emergency contraception prescriptions because of their
religious and moral opposition.28 In a press release, the Governor said,
"pharmacies are not free to let [religious] beliefs stand in the way of
their obligation to their customers." 29 In a letter to Family-Pac, the
Governor advised that if individual pharmacists refused to fill certain
birth control prescriptions, their employers would face significant
penalties. 30 Finally, in March of 2006, the Governor announced that
pharmacists who object to dispensing certain drugs on moral grounds
"should find another profession."31
B. Burden on Pharmacies Instead of Pharmacists Does Not
Alleviate the Problem.
Although the Illinois "Duty to Dispense" rule addresses the
duties of pharmacies not pharmacists, it impacts pharmacists since they
are the ones who must dispense the contraceptive drugs at the
pharmacy. Therefore, if they refuse to dispense based on religious
beliefs, they subject their pharmacies to liability and consequently,
26 Press Release, American Pharmacists Association, Statement of the American
Pharmacists Association and the Illinois Pharmacists Association, Illinois Governor
Denigrates Pharmacy Profession, (Dec. 2, 2005) (on file with author).
27 Menges v. Blagojevich, 451 F. Supp. 2d 992, 997 (C.D. Ill. 2006).
28 id.
29 News Release, Office of the Governor, Statement From Governor Rod Blagojevich:
In Response to Lawsuit Filed by Pat Roberton's American Center for Law and Justice
Challenging Governor's Emergency Rule for Pharmacies (Apr. 13, 2005), available
at
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/PressReleasesListShow.cfm?RecNum=3849.
30 Menges, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 997.
31 Id
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many will lose their jobs or will be discriminated against in the hiring
process because of their beliefs.
However, some argue that by placing the burden of compliance
on pharmacies and not individual pharmacists, Illinois has
circumvented the argument of freedbm of conscience and religion
because business entities do not enjoy the moral freedoms guaranteed
under the law as individuals do.32 The issue of whether businesses have
moral being in a society is also a highly debatable topic but even if one
accepts the notion that businesses are not moral entities, the practical
effect Illinois' "duty to dispense" law has on individual pharmacists
can not be ignored just because the rule's title says it applies only to
pharmacies. Actually, the rule in application allows pharmacies more
freedom since it can choose to stock or not stock; but the individual
pharmacists little freedom because if their pharmacy chooses to stock
the drug he or she must disburse it or risk being fired for subjecting the
pharmacy to liability and if the pharmacy chooses not to stock the drug,
then he or she must have the drug ordered by the pharmacy or transfer
the patient to another pharmacy but only if the patient so desires.
Also relevant is that many pharmacies in small towns are owned
and operated by the pharmacist and only one or two pharmacists are
employed. In these cases, if the pharmacy chooses to stock some
contraception but not to stock Plan B, the patient has the right to force
the pharmacy to order the drug and fill the prescription or else be held
liable under the rule for its failure to do so. For example, the plaintiff
in the Morr-Fitz case, Luke Vander Bleek, is the owner and head
pharmacist of his two northwestern Illinois pharmacies in Morrison and
Prophetsville so the practical effect if his pharmacy violated the rule
would be that his only source of income in his businesses would be
subject to sanctions.33
C. Walgreens Settlement Not a Cure for All Pharmacies.
In another case against Governor Blagojevich, Walgreens
settled out of court in October of 2007 with the State of Illinois and
plaintiff pharmacists to allow an objecting pharmacist to have a
working relationship with a non-objecting remote pharmacist, who
would authorize a licensed technician to dispense on the remote
32 See generally Tomkowiak, supra note 2.
33 Interview with Luke Vander Bleek, Plaintiff in Morr-Fitz v. Blagojevich, 867
N.E.2d 1164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), (May 15, 2008) (on file with author).
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pharmacist's behalf. 34 This arrangement works out well for Walgreens
because it has licensed technician managers on duty for every shift so
they can cover the objecting pharmacists refusals. 35
However, many pharmacies do not have the privilege of having
licensed technicians on staff at all times.36 Rural or independent
pharmacies may not have sufficient demand to support hiring a
technician just to dispense one drug. In addition, putting this added
responsibility for patient's health care on a technician as opposed to a
pharmacist, who has more training on the topic, might not be viewed as
the most professionally responsible alternative. 37 Thus, arguably, in
many pharmacy settings, allowing licensed technicians to dispense the
drug would not make good business or professional sense.
D. The Multi-State Pharmacy Dilemma
Another problem that arises is how franchised pharmacies with
a nationwide presence will comply with different rules in every state.
A brief survey of the ways states have chosen to regulate this issue
shows the confusion that exists for multi-state pharmacies. Four states
have similar laws with similar problems as Illinois. California, Nevada,
Maine and New York, have "duty to dispense laws" for emergency
contraception, which place an affirmative duty on either the pharmacist
or pharmacy to ensure prescriptions for contraception are filled without
delay.38 Some state's pharmacy boards have regulated the issue by
declaring it a pharmaceutical professional obligation to provide timely
access to contraception or to provide a means by which it may be
obtained. 39 For example, in Wisconsin, pharmacist Neil Noeson
received a reprimand from the state board with an approximately
$20,000 monetary penalty for costs of the proceeding, was ordered to
file a plan stating how he would make sure patients received their
lawful medications in the future, and was required to undergo six hours
of continuing pharmacy education in order to keep his pharmacy
34 Interview with Mike Patton, Executive Director Illinois Pharmacists Association,
(May 15, 2008) (on file with author).
35 id.
36 Id.
3 7 id,
38 Tomkowiak, supra, at 1353.
39 National Women's Law Ctr., Pharmacist Refusals 101 (July 2008), at 3, available
at http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/PharmacyRefusalsJulyFINAL.pdf.
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license.40 In North Carolina, the pharmacy board states that a
pharmacist with an ethical conflict to a drug still must not obstruct a
patient from obtaining that medication and must take proactive measure
to ensure the patient receives their medication.
4
'
On the other hand, four states, South Dakota, Arkansas,
Mississippi, and Georgia, have pharmacist refusal laws that give the
pharmacist a broad right to refuse to dispense based on his or her
conscience.42 In South Dakota, pharmacists can not only refuse to
dispense emergency contraception but they also do not have any duty to
refer or transfer the patient nor provide advance notice to their patients
as to their plans not to dispense the drug.43 Arkansas specifically
declares that pharmacists have authority to refuse to furnish any kind of
contraceptive supplies and that medical institutions, including
pharmacies, are protected from liability based on religious or
conscientious reusals.44 Georgia's legislature states that it is not
"unprofessional" behavior to refuse to fill any Trescriptions if it is
against a pharmacist's personal belief to do so. Mississippi allows
healthcare providers, including pharmacists, to refuse to participate in
any service to which he or she is morally or religiously opposed.4t
Obviously, there is a great divide among state legislatures in
this country as to how this issue should be handled. As can be
observed above, the political leaning of the state is often indicative of
how the state will handle this issue. Not surprisingly, more
conservative states tend to value conscience protection over
contraceptive rights and more liberal states tend to value contraceptive
rights over conscience protection. This, in turn, makes it extremely
difficult for a multi-state pharmacy chain to plan its business
procedures according to the law because the law, and even the
reasoning behind the law, is vastly different in every state.
40 Robert K. Vischer, Conscience in Context: Pharmacist Rights and the Eroding
Moral Marketplace, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 83, 88 (2006).
41 Tomkowiak, supra, at 1355.
42 National Women's Law Ctr., Pharmacist Refusals 101 (September 2006 Update), at
3, http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/PharmacyRefisalsJulyFINAL.pdf.
43 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-11-70 (2006).
44 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(4)-(5) (West 2006).
45 GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 480-5-.03(n) (2006).
46 MISS. CODE ANN. §41-107-5 (2005).
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E. Abortion Law and Federal Conscience Protection
In fact, rational minds in the United States have differed on
issues such as these ever since the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade
in 1973. 47 Conscience protection for individuals and entities involved
in health care has been evolving ever since abortion rights, which
prohibit any undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion.41 Like
the moral objection faced by pharmacists with dispensing emergency
contraception, doctors, nurses, and other healthcare staff have sought
protection from being forced to participate in an abortion, which they
see as ending a life.
Arguably, Congress foresaw the inevitable moral arguments
that would result from Roe and promptly reacted with the Church
amendment that same year. The Church amendment made it clear that
individuals or entities that received federal funds or assistance could
not be required by any state actor to perform or assist in an abortion if
contrary to religious beliefs or moral convictions. 49 Further, the Church
amendment protected individuals in employment disputes by
prolibiting discrimination on the basis of a refusal to perform an
abortion because of an employee's religious beliefs or moral
convictions. 50 The Weldon Amendment provided further protection
from government coercion of abortion in 2004, by holding back federal
funds from any state or local government that discriminates against any
health care entity, including physicians, other health care professionals,
hospitals, a provider-sponsored organization, a health maintenance
organization, a health insurance plan, or any other kind of health care
facility organization or plan, on the basis that the entity does not
provide, pay for, provide coverage for, or refer for abortions.5' In
addition, the Danforth Amendment prohibited discriminatory action
against doctors, medical students, and health training programs by a
state or local government due to any refusal to provide a wide range of
abortion related services for any reason whether it be religious/moral or
not.
52
47 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973).
48 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-89 (1992).
49 Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91, 95 (1973); codified at 42 U.S.C. §300a-7 (2000).
5o Id. at §300a-7(c)(1)(B).
51 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, §508(d)(1), 118
Stat. 2809, 3163; see also Dep'ts of Lab., Health & Hum. Serv. and Educ. & Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No 109-149, §508(d)(1), 119 Stat.
2833, 2879.
52 20 U.S.C § 1688 (2008).
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F. State Conscience Protection
State Legislatures also passed various conscience protection
statutes in response to Roe v. Wade. Many gave healthcare providers
an unconditional ability to step away based on a conscience objection.53
Illinois, for example, enacted one of the most comprehensive right of
conscience laws in the nation. This statute sets forth the public policy
of the state as: "to respect and protect the right of conscience of all
persons who refuse to obtain, receive or accept, or who are engaged in,
the delivery of, arrangement for, or payment of health care services and
medical care" and "to prohibit all forms of discrimination,
disqualification, coercion, disability or imposition of liability" upon
persons who refuse to act contrary to their conscience or conscientious
convictions in "refusing to obtain, receive, accept, deliver, pay for, or
arrange for the payment of healthcare services and medical care."
54
Conscience is defined as "a sincerely held set of moral convictions
arising from belief in and relation to God, or which, though not so
derived, arises from a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that
filled by God among adherents to religious faiths." 55 The plaintiffs in
the Morr-Fitz case argue this statute ushers in broad protection for all
those involved in healthcare and thus discrimination based on their
moral opposition should be prohibited.56
Other states, such as Hawaii, provide liability protection for
hospitals and individuals for their refusals to participate in abortion
procedures.57 Pennsylvania, California, Nebraska, and Oregon allow
refusals for abortion services and the rendering of information about
53 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-601(a) (2005); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 19-13-d54(f)
(2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit., 24, § 1791(a) (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111(8)
(West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-1-4 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 146.1
(West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-443 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§
1591, 1592 (2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.20181 (West 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 145.414(a) (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-2 (LexisNexis 2003); N.C..
GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1(e), (f) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-16-14 (2002); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4731.91 (LexisNexis 2006); 18 P.A. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(d)
(West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34- 23a-1 1, 12 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
15-204 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-6-106 (2007).
54 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2 (1998).
51 Id. at 70/3(e).
56 Illinois Courts website, Illinois Supreme Court Oral Argument Audio & Video for
Morr-Fitz v. Blagojevich, available at
http://163.191.183.117/court/SupremeCourt!Video/2008/031808_104692.wmv.
57 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §453-16(d) (LexisNexis 2005).
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abortion so long as the objection is made available to the public.58
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New
York, Rhode Island, and Virginia, permit objections if the person
refusing states in writing the reasons for objecting. 59 Montana and
Kentucky, like Illinois, also have provisions for discrimination on the
basis of a refusal.6 °
G. What is the Pharmacist's Dilemma?
At the crux of the Roe debate and the subsequent conscience
protection arguments lies the question of when life begins. This ethical
dilemma is also the cause for the pharmaceutical debate surrounding
emergency contraception. Some say that when an egg is fertilized there
is no other descriptive word for the organism but human because it
contains, at that moment, all the genetic material necessary for a human
life.6' Others claim that life begins at implantation of the fertilized egg
to the uterus because this attachment must take place to sustain life and
many fertilized eggs naturally will not implant. 62 Still others have
maintained that life begins at birth since the baby is no longer reliant on
the mother's placenta for nourishment.
63
58 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(c) (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
337 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 435.475(1), 435.485(1) (West 2003); 16 PA.
CODE § 51.1.32 (2005).
59 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2151 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-104
(West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §16-12-142 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-612
(2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/13 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.800(4) (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112 section 121 (West
2003); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-i(1) (McKinney 1992); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 955.2(a) (West 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17-11 (1996) (providing an exception
for scheduled abortions only); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75 (2004).
60 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/7 (West 2002); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.800(5)(c) (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2007).61Pharmacists for Life International, Abortifacient FAQs: "Oral Contraceptives"
FAQs: A Pill You Might Not Want to Swallow (2005);
http://www.pfli.org/faq_oc.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2008), see also The American
Heritage Medical Dictionary 660 (2007); T.W. SADLER, LANGMAN'S MEDICAL
EMBRYOLOGY 3 (8th ed. 2000), see also CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH 2322 (2d ed. 1997).
62 Donald W. Herbe, The Right to Refuse: A Call for Adequate Protection of a
Pharmacist's Right to Refuse Facilitation ofAbortion and Emergency Contraception,
17 J.L. & HEALTH 77, 86 (2002).
63 Catholics For Choice, Abortion and Catholic Thought: The Little-Told History,
CONSCIENCE (Autumn 1996),
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It is difficult to test with certainty how emergency contraception
works to prevent pregnancy because of the complexity of the
reproduction process and the inability to effectively test a human
control group. 64 Barr Pharmacueticals/Duramed, the makers of Plan B,
state in their patient pamphlet that the drug's mode of action is stopping
ovulation or the production of eggs in females, preventing fertilization
or the uniting of egg and sperm, or preventing attachment or
implantation of the fertilized egg to the uterus. 65 Another possible way
that it prevents pregnancy is by inhibiting the transport of the fertilized
egg to the uterus.6 Although Barr states that the main mechanism of
action is prevention of ovulation, statistics show that it would prevent
or delay ovulation only when given within a small window of the fertile
cycle, within two to seven days before ovulation would have naturally
occurred.67 However, data on the occurrence or number of instances
that the drug inhibits pregnancy post-fertilization is currently
unavailable.68 Consequently, there is no definitive, scientifically backed
conclusion as to how this drug actually works in a given situation.
However, some theorize that the number of post-fertilization incidents
could be as high as 78%.69
So, is Plan B causing an abortion? Traditionally, abortifacient is
defined as prevention of implantation in the uterus so one answer may
be: "Not necessarily but potentially." Or a better answer may be "It
depends." It depends on when an individual believes life begins and it
depends on how the drug works in a given situation, which is
undetermined thus far with reliable certainty. However, regardless of
an individual's personal beliefs on this scientific issue, policy makers
must realize that rational minds have differed on this issue for centuries
and pharmacists are no exception in this sensitive moral debate.
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/pubs/cfcarchive/articles/TheHistoryof
Abortion.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
64 Edward L. Rivet II, Morning After Pills/Emergency Contraception: Fact, Fiction &
Fraud, RIGHT TO LIFE OF MICHIGAN (Sept. 2006).
65 Barr Pharmaceuticals/Duramed Plan B Patient Pamplet, How Plan B Works,
http://www.go2planb.com/ForConsumers/AboutPlanB/WhatisPlanB.aspx (last visited
Nov. 3, 2008).
66 WHITE, supra note 12, at 89.
67 Rivet, supra note 63, at 1.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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III. ISSUES
The underlying issue concerning this legal and ethical debate is
the competing fundamental rights of religious and moral beliefs versus
access to contraception. First, we will address this issue from the legal
standpoint, analyzing the effect of federal and state codes and court
precedent on the Morr-Fitz v. Blagojevich case. Again, we have
chosen the state of Illinois to exemplify the legal struggle because
Illinois has both broad conscience/religion protection statutes and a
duty to dispense emergency contraception law. As previously
mentioned, other states are in this paradoxical position so Illinois
would be representative of many states that are grappling with this
issue. Second, we will look at the issue from a public policy point of
view to provide resolution to the question of which fundamental right
should be valued over the other or whether it is possible for this clash
of rights to be avoided by government actors altogether. Finally, we
will present a philosophical perspective on the issue by discussing the
underlying principles that support each right.
In the legal discussion section, we will discuss the legal position
of the pharmacist plaintiffs in the Morr-Fitz case in detail, as this
position has been largely ignored by previous academic publications.
This position focuses on the statutory and constitutional protection of
the right of conscience and right to religious beliefs and the
professional rights and responsibilities involved in pharmacy according
to the American Pharmacy Association. Specifically, we will address
the Illinois Right of Conscience Act, the Illinois Religious Restoration
Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution and the American Pharmacy Association's
Code of Ethics and give the arguments that can be made in favor of a
pharmacist's right to refuse to dispense emergency contraception under
each. Then, we will address the opposing legal view to give a balanced
legal background to the issue. This position highlights the First
Amendment's exception for generally applicable laws as well as the
potential for "Duty to Dispense" laws to pass the strict scrutiny test. It
also points out the Title VII obstacles to religious discrimination
protection on this issue. Another issue unique to Illinois is a statutory
interpretation issue found in the Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience
Act that leaves pharmacists off the list of protected individuals.
Finally, the American Pharmacy Association's focus on pharmacists'
duties to their patients will be addressed.
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The public policy section will delineate the zero sum nature of
this issue. We will then address the ways that the competing rights of
contraceptive use and religious freedom can be compared by
policymakers to determine which right should prevail. An important
aspect of this discussion is the role that technology has played in
creating this problem as well as the role technology can play in
resolving the issue. Finally, we will look at the consequences to both
the consumer and the pharmacist in valuing one right over another.
Finally, the philosophical perspective section broadens the
nature of the issue to a discussion on the essence of democracy. By
dissecting each right into the principles and premises that form it, we
will expand on the discussion of comparing the competing rights. By
contrasting the privacy right that underlies contraceptive use with the
right of differing beliefs that underlies conscience protection, we will
discuss how the marketplace of ideas drives societal morality.
IV. LEGAL
A. The Plaintiff/Pharmacist's Position
1. Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience
The statute with the closest connection to the Morr-Fitz case is
the Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act.7 0 As mentioned above,
this act provides that no health care personnel can be held civilly or
criminally liable to a person or public official for refusing to participate
in health care services that are contrary to his or her conscience.7 1 The
protection also includes discrimination on the basis of one's
conscience. Conscience is broadly defined as any religious belief or
sincerely held moral belief.72 Although not specifically mentioned as
health care personnel in the statute, pharmacist is defined by another
Illinois statute, the Illinois Pharmacy Practice Act, as "an individual
health care professional and provider currently licensed by this State to
engage in the practice of pharmacy."7 3 Here, Plaintiff Luke Vander
Bleek is claiming that his religious belief that this drug terminates a
human life because prevents pregnancy after the egg is fertilized is
against his conscience to dispense, which is what the rule is requiring
70 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3-70/4 (1998).
71 Id. at 70/4.
72 Id. at 70/3.
73 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85/3(k-5) (West 2007).
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him to do in order to keep his job or avoid significant fines. 74
Consequently, the State, by its own action, is restricted in enacting
rules that will coerce a health care provider to violate his or her
conscience in this way.
2. Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Secondly, the Illinois Religious Restoration Freedom Act 75 was
enacted to restore the compelling interest test utilized in free exercise
claims before the United States Supreme Court issued its 1990 decision
in Employment Division v. Smith.76 The Illinois Religious Freedom
Restoration Act guarantees that the State government cannot
substantially burden the exercise of religion without compelling
justification.77 This law is based on the declared principle that the free
exercise of religion is an inherent, fundamental and inalienable right
78secured by the Illinois Constitution. The statute goes on to state that
the government may not substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability
unless the government demonstrates it is in furtherance of a compelling
government interest and it is the least restrictive means of furthering the
interest.79 Exercise of religion is defined as "an act or refusal to act that
is substantially motivated by religious belief."80 Proponents of the
Governor's executive order claim that access to health care and the
need for emergency contraception is the government motivation,
however, the rule is not narrowly tailored to meet that goal. The rule
only applies the Division I pharmacies, not hospitals or emergency
rooms, which is arguably where the drug is the most useful due to ease
of access especially for dangerous pregnancies. In fact, Illinois as
well as several other states, recognize the need for emergency
contraception in hospitals by requiring all hospitals to provide rape
74 Illinois Courts website, Illinois Supreme Court Oral Argument Audio & Video for
Morr-Fitz v. Blagojevich, available at
http://163.191.183.117/court/SupremeCourt/Video/2008/031808_104692.wmv.
75 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/10-35/15 (West 2001).
76 Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see
also 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15.
77 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/15.
78 Id. at 35/10 (a)(1).
79 Id. at 35/15.
80Id. at 35/5.
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victims with emergency contraception or to inform them about how to
obtain it.
81
3. Federal Law: The First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act
Under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, a
state law designed to discriminate against an individual because of his
or her religious beliefs is subject to strict scrutiny. 82 Again, this means
that the state must show that the rule serves a compelling interest and is
narrowly tailored to meet that interest. However, if a law is religiously
neutral and generally applicable, it is not subject to strict scrutiny even
if there is an indirect effect on religious beliefs and practices." On the
other hand, official action that is masked as neutral but is in reality
hostile can be found to target religious conduct.
84
A case brought in the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois, Menges v. Blagojevich, analyzes the federal
laws that come into play with this issue. In this case, Plaintiff John
Menges claimed he was fired when he failed to agree in writing to
dispense emergency contraception as was required by his employer,
Walgreens, after Blagojevich's executive order.85 Although the federal
district court did not rule on the merits of the case, the court presumed
the plaintiff could substantiate their claims and thus denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss. 86 However, the court did analyze the
issues posed by the case in its motion to dismiss written opinion. The
cause of action included Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the First
Amendment right to religious freedom. With regards to Title VII, the
court in Menges denied the Governor's motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the rule could require employers to discriminate on the
basis of religion in violation of the Act. 8 7 Although in some cases the
employer could have an undue hardship defense, claiming that the
pharmacist's refusal to dispense causes more than a "de minimis"
81 Marie McCullough, New Jersey Must Tell Rape Victims of Emergency Birth
Control, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 24, 2005, at B6.
82 See generally Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 883 (1990).
83 Id.
84 See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993).
85 Menges, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 998.86 Id. at 995.
871Id. at 1003.
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burden on the employer, in many cases, a reasonable accommodation
could be made, which is required under Title VII.88
With regard to the First amendment claim, the court in Menges
concluded that it must first look at the face of the rule and then, if
facially neutral, the true purpose of the rule. 89 In evaluating the rule, the
court in Menges decided that it was facially neutral but its purpose is
made clear by the Governor's public statements that the rule's purpose
is to "force individuals who have religious objections to Emergency
Contraceptives to compromise their beliefs or leave the practice of
pharmacy. ' 9° Therefore, the rule is not religiously neutral. As such, the
court held that the rule is not generally applicable and thus could fail
strict scrutiny.91 The rule is not narrowly tailored to meet the interest in
that it only covers Division I pharmacies, not hospitals and emergency
rooms, which, if included, would make emergency contraceptives more
readily available. In addition, in order to avoid punishment under the
rule a pharmacy may elect to not carry any form of contraceptive. This
viable option would decrease the availability of contraceptives, not
increase it. Thus, it is at least plausible that Illinois' Rule is
unconstitutional.
4. American Pharmacist's Association Recognizes the Need for
Conscientious Refusal
Although the American Pharmacist Association's (APhA) Code
of Ethics for Pharmacists is not binding as law, the Code does provide
some guidance on professional obligations. The Association's
resolution with the closest connection to this issue states: "APhA
recognizes the individual pharmacist's right to exercise conscientious
refusal and supports the establishment of systems to ensure patient's
access to legally prescribed therapy without compromising the
pharmacist's right of conscientious refusal., 92 The APhA Committee
81d. at 1004.
89 d. at 999-1000.
9
'1d. at 1000.
9'Id. at 1001.
92 Press Release, Letter from the Am. Pharmacists Ass'n (APhA) to the Office of Pub.
Health & Human Serv., HHS Proposed Rule on Provider Conscience: Docket ID:
HHS-OS-2008-00 11; Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services
Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices In Violation
of Federal Law (Sept. 25, 2008) available at
http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID = 1781
0&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
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Report expressly allows for "stepping away" from an activity that
violates the pharmacist's conscience. 93 However, the APhA has not
specifically directed how a pharmacist should balance the competing
interests of serving patients and conscience protection.
B. The State of Illinois Position
First, "Duty to Dispense" laws could be viewed as generally
applicable under First Amendment analysis. In Menges, the court
reasoned the Illinois executive order was not generally applicable due
to the public commentary of the Governor as noted above. 4 However,
many state's duty to dispense legislation would not have the same
inflammatory history and one could argue that even in Illinois the
Governor's comments do not rise to the level of proving the rule's
purpose is to target a religious practice or belief.
Second, even if a court finds the rule is not generally applicable
under the First Amendment, one might successfully argue that duty to
dispense rules like the one in Illinois do pass the strict scrutiny test as
written or with minor adjustments. Reproductive rights are considered
fundamental rights. Plus, access to legal prescriptions is also highly
valued in our society. Thus, it would not be difficult to show that the
state has a compelling interest to protect. Consequently, the question
would immediately turn to narrow tailoring to meet the interest. In
Illinois, there is some question as to why all pharmacies are not
included in the rule but one may argue that Division I pharmacies are
statistically causing the obstacle in obtaining emergency contraception
or if necessary, an amendment to include all pharmacies is an easy fix
to insure narrow tailoring.
Third, it is also logical to assume that Title VII liability can be
avoided because the burden on the employer is substantial. Although
the court in Menges v. Blagojevich ultimately overlooked the Title VII
obstacles for the plaintiff since it was deciding a motion to dismiss, the
court reasoned that it would be difficult for the plaintiffs to demonstrate
that accommodating their beliefs would impose only a de minimus
burden on the employer. 95 Since the plaintiff pharmacists did not want
93 Am. Pharmacists Ass'n, Congress Eyes Birth Control Bill, (Apr. 18, 2005)
available at
http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=PharmacyToday2&templat
e=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8742 (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
94 Menges, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1000-02.
95Id. at 1003
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to dispense the drug at all, pharmacies may have to rearrange other
pharmacists' schedules, hire a sufficient number of non-objecting
pharmacists, or keep extra personnel for each shift in order to
accommodate an objecting pharmacist. Obviously, substantial hardship
could result from a pharmacy's attempt to accommodate while
complying with the state's duty to dispense law.
Fourth, but specific only to the Illinois Healthcare Right of
Conscience statute, there is a statutory interpretation argument that
conscience protection was never extended to pharmacists because they
were left off of the list of protected individuals in the statute.96 In 1997,
when the Illinois Healthcare Right of Conscience Act was under
review, pharmacists were included in the original drafts. 97 However, it
is somewhat of a legislative mystery as to why pharmacists were left
out of the final draft of the bill. Perhaps even more peculiar is the fact
that clerical positions at healthcare institutions have been interpreted by
Illinois courts to be covered under the statute. Specifically, the Illinois
Healthcare Right of Conscience Act protected a language interpreter at
a healthcare facility against discrimination when she was fired for not
providing her interpreter services about abortions.98 Thus, one may
reason that if the Illinois legislature wanted to include pharmacists in
the statute's protection, it would not have left them out in the final draft
and if interpreter services at healthcare facilities that provide abortions
are covered by the statute, surely the legislature must be intentionally
treating pharmacists as a different classification.
Fifth, United States Supreme Court decisions give contraceptive
use the highest level of constitutional protection including the right to
obtain contraceptive services free from governmental interference and,
as such, conscience statutes could be one example of such
governmental interference.99 The Supreme Court precedent of Griswold
and Eisenstadt collectively held that using contraception is considered a
fundamental right under right of privacy law and consequently it should
be free from governmental interference. 100 Consequently, conscience
protection that caused an undue burden to a woman's right to access
contraception could be viewed as a constitutional violation.
96 Interview with Mike Patton, supra note 33 (on file with author).
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Tomkowiak, supra note 2, at 1332.
100 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
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Finally, although the APhA Code of Ethics does not
conclusively state how to appropriately balance this issue, its eight
principles for pharmaceutical behavior highlight the non-discriminatory
nature of pharmacy and the profession's dedication to the serve the best
interests of their patients. 01 Duties, such as "placing concern for the
well-being of the patient at the center of professional practice" and
"4respect personal and cultural differences among patients", show the
Association suggests that a pharmacist's primary ethical obligation is to
insure patients obtain their lawfully prescribed medicine.' 
02
C. Admission of Two-Sided Nature of this Legal Issue is the First
Step for Recovery
One common fault of writing on this topic is the author's failure
to adequately address the valid legal arguments on the State's side of
the debate. As we have shown, constitutional legal justification is
available on both sides of this issue primarily because both sides deal
with fundamental rights. Federal and state statutory backing is also
plausible on both sides of the debate. The APhA cannot even
conclusively determine how pharmacists should balance the competing
interests and even if it could, its Code of Ethics is not binding for a
pharmacist to follow.
Therefore, we believe one must recognize that the state and
federal legal precedent on this issue could reasonably be interpreted in
favor of either side. As such, it is imperative that courts across the
nation realize that the determining factor of this debate may not be
legal in nature but rather ideologically and (perhaps unfortunately)
politically based. In fact, the essence of the dispute will either call for a
value judgment by a given court in deciding whether to make the right
to contraceptive use or the right to conscience paramount or will
demand a legislative mandate to remain neutral, allowing government
actors to step away from the value determination. Consequently, the
public policy aspect of this article is perhaps just as important as the
legal arguments.
'0' Am. Pharmacists Ass'n, Code of Ethics (2004), available at
http://www.pharmacist.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Code of Ethics forPharm
acists&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=5420 (last visited Nov. 14,
2008)
10 2 id.
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V. PUBLIC POLICY
A. A Zero Sum Game
Policymakers cannot get around the fact that the crux of the
matter is the underlying value given to the right to privacy versus the
right to conscience. One can argue the merits of the case, whether the
situation fits under the parameters of a given conscience protection
statute, whether government intervention is necessary for greater access
to a drug and even whether this case should follow the precedent set out
by prior abortion law, but at the end of the day one has to make a
determination as to the value government should give to the freedom of
choice of a woman and her reproduction as it relates to the freedom of
privacy versus the freedom of individuals to make choices based on
their moral, ethical and/or religious beliefs. This is precisely why states
have been so divided on this issue to date. Since the issue boils down
to choosing women's rights versus religious freedom, naturally states
have tended to split down political party lines on the issue.
Therefore, we will look at the issue from the stance of a court
attempting to determine how to value the right to contraception or right
to conscience in a given case. Using this analysis, we conclude that the
issue necessarily becomes a zero sum game in that one right must win
at the expense of the other right, at least at some level. Then, we will
examine the possibility of a government neutrality position that would
divert that value determination into the hands of the consumers.
B. A Pitfall in Policymaking
Unfortunately, instead of recognizing the complexity of the
issue, some scholars have based their public policy argument on several
specific stories at the expense of the bigger picture. One oft cited
account occurred in St. Charles, Illinois when a twenty-nine-year-old
art teacher was refused her emergency contraception prescription
because of the "personal beliefs" of the pharmacist.10 Another example
commonly used to show the repulsive nature of pharmacists acting out
of conscience involves Kim Smith, a married mother of a newborn
baby who attempted to fill a prescription for emergency contraception
after experiencing a birth control failure with her husband. This
103 Sarah J. Vokes, Just Fill the Prescription: Why Illinois' Emergency Rule
Appropriately Resolves the Tension Between Religion and Contraception in the
Pharmacy Context, 24 LAW & INEQ. 399 (2006).
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northern California resident was denied her prescription by the
pharmacist, who also refused to transfer the prescription and gave a
soliloquy about Smith's irresponsibility. 1
04
Proponents of the right of contraception use these and other
examples, to argue that conscience clauses unfairly discriminate against
women, threaten women's reproductive health, and grossly interfere
with a woman's right to privacy by blocking access to contraception.
They highlight the far-reaching nature of these harmful consequences
by showing staggering statistics that the vast majority of women in the
United States use some type of birth control pills for contraception. 1
05
After hearing the factual situations of several plaintiffs who
were denied their prescriptions and focusing on the fundamental right
to privacy and the potential discriminatory effects against a super
majority of women, at first glance it seems most humane and respectful
to value contraception access over conscience protection. However,
"tunnel vision" policymaking, which looks only at specific fact patterns
in making a determination, can fail to recognize the overall
ramifications of setting a particular policy. Therefore, legislators
should carefully evaluate the nature of this comparison of values in
order to avoid oversimplification of the issue.
C. Access to Contraception: Inability v. Inconvenience?
Interestingly, most of the patients, whose denial stories have
been publicized, the conscientious refusals resulted in only a temporary
inconvenience in obtaining emergency contraception. 106 By their own
accounts, these women have driven less than an hour to obtain an
emergency contraception prescription. 1 7 One complainant admitted to
filling the prescription in less than an hour after the refusal took
place. 10
8
In addition to the testimonials of the affected women
themselves, even small town data reveals emergency contraception is
available upon a local pharmacist's refusal within just over a 15-mile
radius from a given patient. 10 9 For most Americans this drive should
104 Tomkowiak, supra note 2, at 1330.
105 Id.
106 Kyung Song, Olympia Women Complain After Pharmacies Refuse Prescriptions.
SEATTLE TIMEs, Aug. 1, 2006, at AS.
107 See National Women's Law Ctr., Pharmacist Refusals 101, supra note 38.
10 8 id.
109 Robin F. Wilson, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive
Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 41, 52-3 (2008).
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not pose an insurmountable problem. According to the Federal
Highway Administration, 870 per 1,000 or 87% of the driving age
population in the United States are licensed drivers. 110 Of this 87%
there are more licensed female drivers than males."' These statistics do
not even take into account other means of transportation, such as public
transit systems in cities.
Another example supporting accessibility comes via Planned
Parenthood. Planned Parenthood prides itself in supplying emergency
contraception with no questions asked and that it's clinics are readily
accessible in all fifty states with eight hundred and eighty clinics
nationwide. 1
12
Since Plan B's shelf life is two years, a woman who is sexually
active could also acquire the drug well in advance of the 72-hour
window in which she must take it, even if she prefers obtaining the
drug from a pharmacy in her area. 13 With a little planning, there is no
reason why a woman could not take emergency contraception
immediately following intercourse. Chances are, even if she does not
get the drug in advance, she could still access the drug within the 72-
hour timeframe at a Planned Parenthood.
In addition, if she is able to use the Internet, which constitutes
the super-majority of adult Americans under age 49, she could have the
drug at home within 24 hours. According to census information, 82%
of Americans ages 18-29 and 80% ages 30-49 use the Internet at least
on an occasional basis.' 14 In addition, over 50% of females in the
United States have Internet access at home and at work and have used
the Internet with in the last 30 days. 115 Although statistical information
110 Federal Highway Administration, Licensed Drivers By Sex and Ration to
Population-2006 http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs06/pdf/dllc.pdf (updated in
Oct. 2007).
111 Id.
112 Planned Parenthood, About Us,
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/about-us-90.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2008).
113 Barr Pharmaceuticals/Duramed Plan B Pharmacist Information, Stocking
Information,
http://www.go2planb.com/Plan-b-pharmacists/plan-b-otc.aspx (last visited Nov. 14,
2008).
114 U.S. Census, Online Statistical Abstract of the U.S., Adult Computer and Adult
Internet Users, by Selected Characteristics: 1995-2005,
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2007/tables/07s1l38.xls [hereinafter Adult
Computer and Internet Use]
115 U.S. Census, Online Statistical Abstract of the U.S., Internet Access and Usage
and Online Service Usage: 2006,
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varies on the relation between average income and Internet usage, it
appears Internet usage and access is not necessarily correlated to level
of income. 11 6 Consequently, most adult women in their childbearing
years, regardless of their income, could use the Internet to purchase
emergency contraception.
Further, purchasing the drug on the Internet is an easy process.
A simple "Google" search using the words "Order Plan B" or "Order
Morning After Pill" revealed over five on-line pharmacies on the first
result page where Plan B could be purchased and shipped to the
consumer's home. 17 Several of these on-line pharmacies offered
guaranteed overnight shipping for a nominal charge and free shipping
for standard delivery. 118 The price of the drug on-line ranged from $30-
$50 and the average retail price of the drug is between $39 and $42 so
obtaining the drug on-line should not even result in an inflated price. 119
Thus, "access" may be better represented in this comparison as
"inconvenience." Maybe this is more of an information or planning
crisis than an accessibility issue. As such, a woman is free to access
this drug in a "conscience protection state" so long as she either: a)
does some minor advance planning, b) has access to the internet or c)
has the ability to travel a relatively short distance within a 72-hour
period.
D. Duty to Dispense Leaves No Palatable Option for Pharmacists.
Conversely, a pharmacist in a state with a "duty to dispense"
law does not have as many choices. At least in Illinois, his or her
choices are to dispense if the patient demands or refer the patient if the
patient allows him to. To a pharmacist who believes the drug is
causing an abortion, this is really like saying either you terminate the
life or contribute to someone else taking the life. As for the Illinois
pharmacy owner who does not think it moral to stock emergency
contraception, the only option is to refuse to stock any type of
contraceptive.
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/08s1127.pdf [hereinafter Internet
Access and Usage and Online Service Usage]
116 See Adult Computer and Internet Use supra note 113; see also Internet Access and
Usage and Online Service Usage, supra note 114.
117 Internet search using Google search engine, performed by Suzanne Davis on July
23, 2008.
118 Id
119 Id.
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Yet, some advocates argue that even the smallest inconvenience
in access to birth control must be avoided under the spirit of Griswold
v. Connecticut, which began the new era of technological advances that
led to the development of woman's rights and solidified a woman's
right to have absolute control over her body.' 20 Further, they argue that
the undue burden rules that apply to abortion implicitly apply to
emergency contraception as well such that government cannot interfere
in any way with a woman's right to obtain contraception.
However, the Court in Griswold established only negative rights i.e.
that the government cannot prevent individuals from obtaining birth
control or make its use illegal as Connecticut was attempting to do.'
2
'
Conversely, in Illinois, the government is inferring a positive right to
demand the assistance of others in obtaining a drug. This positive duty
to assist someone in this way is unprecedented. In fact, even
concerning abortion law's undue burden test, the Court in Harris
declared: "[a state] need not remove those obstacles not of its own
creation." 1
22
VI. PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Underlying Premise of Each Right
Finally, when comparing the conflicting rights, we think one
should also be cognizant of the underlying premise that supports each
right. The underlying premise that supports contraceptive use is the
right of privacy or the ability to control one's own body. The
underlying premise that supports religious beliefs is the freedom to
possess different views, ideas and beliefs about life. In this conflict, we
conclude that the right to privacy only exists because the freedom to
have differing views, ideas, and beliefs exists. As such, the value of
conscience could be viewed as a foundation on which other rights build
upon. We would go so far as to say that the right to privacy would
mean nothing in a society if the essence of democracy-the
marketplace of differing ideas--is not protected.
120See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
121 Id.
122 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980).
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B. Right of Conscience is the Foundation for All Other Rights.
We liken this discussion to that of Robert Vischer when he
discusses how individuals need to mediate viewpoints in society.123 It is
this exchange of ideas that allows individuals the freedom to make
associations with others to "live out the promise of freedom in
cooperation and connection with others, gathering together to pursue
commonly held beliefs, values, and worldviews."' 1 4 As Vischer points
out, this concept is not new to this generation. Over 200 years ago,
Alexis de Tocqueville recognized this "principle of association" that
makes our nation great.'12  Thus, if the marketplace of ideas is
monopolized by the state with a morality mandate then the space
traditionally left for reasonable minds to differ and associate about
morality is taken away. 126 As Justice Holmes stated in his famous
dissent in Abrams v. United States, "the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market."' 12 7 In other words, ethical truth is found at the intersection of
individual human ideals and principles and societies' acceptance of that
morality.
This is why we call the right of conscience the foundation that
all other rights are built upon. Without the ability to test individual
ideas of morality in society, no common consensus can be reached as to
which ideals and principles need to be accepted. It is the freedom to
rationalize one's existence and his or her relation to others that leads to
any other principle of "rights." Thus, other "rights" such as privacy,
only come about in a society because rational minds have mediated in
society the principle that people should be able to control what happens
to their own bodies. Consequently, privacy becomes an "end" only
because the freedom to express differing beliefs and ideas in society is
the "means" to that end.
123 Vischer, supra note 39, at 95-99.
124 Robert Vischer, The American Enterprise: The Pharmacist Wars, February 14,
2006 (on file with author).
125 Id. [see above]
126 Vischer, supra note 39, at 114.
127 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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C. The Difference between Affirmative Duties and Negative Rights
If the government takes a power position over morality by
placing an affirmative duty on one side to conform to its mandate then
the foundation of differing ideas in society has been replaced by a
method of morality building that is built from the top down. In other
words, if the government controls the "means" by which a society
arrives at morality, then the "ends" may only reflect the morality of
those in power. Although our democratic government system is
supposed to reflect the views of society through election of government
officials, if some of the views of society are not allowed to be
expressed, it is unlikely the government actors will have a balanced
perspective.
Understandably, if an individual's ethical decisions have a
direct impact on the life, health, or property of another, then the
government must take action by creating a negative shield to protect
against social chaos. For example, most regulation of business is
coined in the negative i.e. you can not do this or that, such as selling
alcohol or cigarettes to underage buyers, distributing illegal drugs,
producing a defective unreasonably dangerous product, selling guns to
ex-felons etc. because these regulations are sufficiently related to
protecting the health, safety and welfare of consumers.
Duty to dispense regulation, on the other hand, demands the
sale of a certain product to a consumer who asks for it, an affirmative
duty. It is true that in some cases, especially when a group is
underrepresented in the marketplace of ideas, affirmative duties may be
necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the group;
however, governments need to tread carefully when it comes to
controlling this way. For example, if the State instead mandated that
pharmacies not discriminate against persons of a certain gender, race,
age or income, then the affirmative duty would be protecting the free
flow of expression in the marketplace of ideas. However, pharmacies
in this case are not distinguishing based on the people group but rather
on the product. This is product discrimination or a business decision
not discrimination based on a person. Governments should insure the
latter discrimination against persons does not occur but that does not
mean the government should place an affirmative duty to force the
pharmacy to provide whatever product a certain people group demands.
Granted, if a product is entirely inaccessible due to pharmacies'
discrimination against the product, i.e. a market failure, and the
government thinks the drug is essential for society, then the
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government may have to force alternative avenues for dispensing the
drug and, if necessary, place an affirmative duty on pharmacies to
dispense. However, as aforementioned, the market has not failed on
this issue and there are many avenues to access the drug so such drastic
affirmative duty measures need not be taken at this point.
D. A Tangible Right vs. A Philosophical Right
It is easy to minimize the importance of differing beliefs in the
marketplace of ideas when faced with an urgent and concrete problem
such as a woman who is denied a valid prescription by her pharmacist
for a drug she desires. It is human nature to feel sorry for a woman
who has had a moral judgment passed upon her by a professional
whom she trusts. Harms, such as this, to which we all as humans can
readily identify, we define as tangible harms. The oft cited case
mentioned above of a married woman and mother to a newborn, who
suffered a birth control failure with her husband and went to her
pharmacist to obtain emergency contraception only to be met with
chastisement for her decision and forced to leave without the drug, is a
perfect example of a tangible right.12 8 A violation of a tangible right
arouses empathy and compassion because by putting oneself in the
woman's shoes, one can easily identify with the physical and/or
emotional harm the complainant faces. Consequently, it is only natural
to want to stand up for the tangible rights of the woman at all costs.
Conversely, the freedom of conscience is an intangible or
philosophical right. The harms of violating such a right are not
immediately apparent or recognizable. The pharmacist does not
necessarily face any physical or emotional harm for filling a valid
prescription. Likely, a vast majority of people would not see any
detriment to the pharmacist whatsoever by placing themselves in his
shoes. Consequently, an intangible right is characterized by the lack of
empathy or compassion that is felt by its violation because it has only
intellectual or philosophical consequence. Instead, the complainant
suffers an existential harm steeped in his ability or freedom to reason
his views on life. It is the intangible rights that allow people to define
who they are and what they stand for and to form common ties with
other like-minded persons in a society in order to gain a common
identity and purpose.
128 Tomkowiak, supra note 2, at 1330.
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Consequently, even though it is tempting to side with the
tangible right in this situation at the expense of the intangible, doing so
can create a much greater philosophical harm in a society. Again, it
comes down to the ability of an individual to freely participate in the
marketplace of ideas by expressing his own ideas, beliefs and
viewpoints, which creates a foundation on which other rights in a
society can be built.
VII. POSITIONS
A. Conscience Must "Win"
Therefore, if one fundamental right must "win", given the
nature of a zero-sum game, then it should be the freedom of conscience
for the foregoing reasons. To summarize, when comparing the two
rights, we found the access to contraception policy arguments to be
more of an inconvenience concern, where women have several
alternative choices for emergency contraception. Meanwhile,
pharmacists were left with no real option other than to violate
conscience under "duty to dispense" legislation. Instead, "duty to
dispense" legislation infers a positive duty on pharmacists to assist a
patient in what he believes is an immoral act. Secondly, it is important
not to discount the importance of intangible or philosophical rights, as
freedom of conscience is the foundation on which other rights are built
and there is inherent value in the ability of humans define themselves
and shape the values of their society.
One of trends in academic writing on this issue we have noticed
is the authors' unwillingness to admit that they are in fact favoring one
right over another and, consequently, they fail to address how they are
comparing the rights and the premises of why they are supporting one
over the other. 129 Most recognize the legal issue of the conflicting
fundamental rights but then propose a solution they call a win-win or
balanced solution that necessarily elevates one of the rights at the
expense of the other.' 30 Recognition that these rights may not be
129 Vokes, supra note 102, at 420; see also Tomkowiak, supra note 2, at 1360; see
also Claire A. Smearman, Drawing the Line: The Legal, Ethical, and Public Policy
Implications of Refusal Clauses for Pharmacists, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 469, 474 (2006);
see also Lorraine Schmail, Birth Control as a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER
L. & POL'Y 139, 140 (2006), see also Robin F. Wilson, supra note 108.
130 Tomkowiak, supra note 2, at 1332; Smearman, supra note 128, at 538.
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reconcilable should necessarily be the first step in determining an
appropriate solution.
B. Tomkowiak's Recommendations
For example, Ms. Sarah Tomkowiak provides the following
recommendations to balance the competing rights and "...allow
individual pharmacists to exercise their moral beliefs, while ensuring
that patients still receive the minimal standard of pharmaceutical
professional care and that women are never denied access to legally
prescribed birth control."'13 1 Tomkowiak states that these beliefs can be
reconciled by federal and state "duty to dispense" legislation, state
pharmacy board regulation prohibiting obstruction of prescriptions and
imposing a duty to provide timely access to contraceptives,
collaborative practice agreements allowing pharmacists to dispense
emergency contraception without an advance prescription from a
physician, AMA and APhA resolutions allowing physicians to dispense
drugs directly in some cases and to develop a registry to inform
consumers of pharmacies' refusal policies, respectively and finally by
employment practices that insure a pharmacist who will dispense
emergency contraception is always available. 1
32
Even at first glance, it is quite obvious which right Tomkowiak
thinks should win at the expense of the other yet she still maintains she
is balancing the competing rights. Tomkowiak ultimately suggests that
state pharmacy boards require pharmacists to provide timely access to
contraception and prohibit obstruction by pharmacists in obtaining any
lawful prescription.' 33 She supports strong action against any
pharmacist who impedes on the patient's ability to obtain birth
control. 134 By allowing pharmacies to be significantly penalized for a
failure to dispense and individual pharmacists to be professionally
sanctioned for their failure to dispense, Tomkowiak has effectively
resolved the issue with no practical balance of rights at all.
131 Tomkowiak, supra note 2, at 1350.
132 Id. at 1350-60.
1 Id at 1355.
134 Id. at 1356.
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C. Wilson's "Live and Let Live" Solution
Ms. Robin Wilson also provides a solution in attempt to balance
the competing rights. Commendably, Wilson expressly recognizes that
her solution could be viewed as a lose-lose solution as opposed to a
win-win. 135 Also, she recognizes that in this enterprise both parties
cannot win. "The ability of the pharmacists to refuse to dispense
irreducibly comes at the expense of the disappointed and
inconvenienced patient; and the ability of the patient to demand EC
from the pharmacist comes necessarily at the pharmacist's expense."
"They [state legislatures] could choose not to burden the professional's
choice at all-prizing religious liberty more highly than access."
Conversely, "They could force providers to provide every service
legally requested-prizing patient access more highly than moral or
religious freedom." 136 She believes that the best we can hope for is the
following "live-and-let-live" solution. She proposes that pharmacies
should be required to stock emergency contraception unless it can
prove that to do so would result in undue hardship. 37 She believes that
Illinois' rule burdens individuals more than facilities, which is
distributing burdens backwards because conscientious objections of
individuals should be afforded more protection than businesses which
lack moral being. 138 Although pharmacies may incur additional expense
by mandatory stocking rules, Wilson maintains this would make
emergency contraception more accessible and pharmacists would be
able to refuse to dispense so long as no significant hardship would
result to the patient or to the business.' 39
Practically, this position again favors right of access to
contraception at the expense of conscience. Although Wilson proposes
that employees should not be discriminated against because of their
beliefs about contraception, in reality that is what must happen in order
for this plan to work in practice. Pharmacies that employ objector
pharmacists would be forced to staff around them making it practically
difficult to keep an objector on staff, especially if the situation did not
rise to the level of the undue hardship exception. In addition, it would
be difficult for the employer to determine when undue hardship had
legally occurred to allow for an objection. Instead, the likely result
135 Wilson, supra note 108, at 63.
1 3 6 
id.
137 id. at 61-62.138 Id. at 61.
139 Id.
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would be for the employer to take the easy route and avoid hiring
objectors. In addition, as Wilson herself points out, if no other non-
objecting pharmacist is available and the patient would experience
hardship if the objecting pharmacist refused service, then the objecting
pharmacist would be forced to dispense. 1
40
D. Vischer's Market-Based Approach
Robert Vischer maintains that this controversy is not necessarily
a two-dimensional issue. Instead, the state should step back and allow
all sides of the debate to "live out their convictions in the marketplace,
maintaining a forum in which pharmacies craft their own particular
conscience policies in response to the demands of their employees and
customers." 141Vischer thinks that if all actors in the situation were left
room by policy makers to operate within the "moral marketplace", an
ongoing exchange of society's pluralistic values would foster social ties
to determine moral ideals in ways that "state-enshrined" rules that
"monopolize the marketplace of ideas" cannot. 142 Vischer argues that
businesses should also be considered actors in the moral marketplace
because they become mediating institutions, which adopt a moral
stance by the goods and services they offer. 143 Further, Vischer claims
that in a pluralistic society, government must create space for
"divergent views to coexist." In addition, he submits that "...where
consensus is impossible, social toleration of competing claims-rather
than the collective elevation of one and the negation of all others-is in
order."1 4
4
Thus, Vischer resolves that the state should only step in the case
of market failure. However, ensuring access to relevant information
would be the state's role. 145 In addition, the state must recognize the
difference between market-driven inconvenience, which is not a market
failure and lack of access, which would demand state intervention.
14 6
Vischer concludes with an insightful quote, "Making space for the
unpopular exercise of conscience is an American tradition, but that
tradition cannot be relegated to the Amish-style enclave and isolated
140 Id. at 63.
141 Vischer, supra note 39, at 86.
142 Id. at 95.
143 Id. at 101-02.
144 Id. at 110.
145 Id. at 112-13.
146 id.
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military conscript; the tradition must extend to the heart of our society,
where our moral convictions and daily existences intersect. If moral
pluralism is going to mean anything in our society, it has to mean
something at Walgreen' s
'147
VIII. PROPOSAL
We find one of the main premises of Vischer's argument
particularly relevant. He insightfully points out that our nation is not
just built on individual freedom, but also by the principle of
association, where individuals live out the promise of freedom in
cooperation and connection with others. 48 Thus, morality driven
associations and allegiances will allow individual consciences to
thrive. 149 We will expound on this premise to provide additional
support for Vischer's argument and then give several suggestions to
enhance the market-based solution.
A. Expansion of Vischer's Premise
As organizational leadership scholars have recognized for many
years now, effective organizations naturally become vehicles for
individuals to realize their own values and identities. 15 This occurs
because they have become outlets for the value concerns of its various
constituencies. Especially concerning pluralistic institutions, such as
health care and academia, "Different segments of society tolerate and
support it for very different reasons, and individual people infuse it
with a wide variety of different values. ' 'lSt Effective businesses thus
attempt to create an integrated entity by "knitting these constituencies
together", fostering cooperation among the different segments, and
ultimately winning the consent of various value groups. 52
Pharmacies are no exception to this rule. Pluralistic in nature,
as professional and market based entities, pharmacies will naturally be
one outlet where many different viewpoints and morals converge. As
"'7Id. at 119.
148 Vischer, supra note 123.
149 Id.
150 Matthew S. Kraatz, Leadership as Institutional Work." A Bridge to the Other Side.,
in INSTITUTIONAL WORK: ACTORS AND AGENCY IN INSTITUTIONAL STUDIES OF
ORGANIZATION, at Ch. 4 (Thomas B. Lawrence, Roy Suddaby and Bernard Leca,
eds.) (forthcoming)
151 id.
152 Id.
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such, a successful pharmacy will allow the marketplace of ideas to
drive its integrated organizational identity.
This organizational theory also accentuates the nature of
societal morality-as a product of both individual ideals and values and
as a part of a whole marketplace where those ideals and values war for
acceptance. In other words, governance needs to let people be both
individually driven moralists, while connecting to society and the roles
and obligations that connection brings.
For example, employees align individual values with a
business' identity by choosing to work for a place employment that he
feels shares his point of view. However, in accepting the job, that
individual now has responsibilities to further the interests of that
organization as a whole and work out his individual concept of truth
within the context of the organization. Meanwhile, businesses attempt
to align their identity with the different segments of consumers, who
have individual values, as well as maintaining the ability of its workers
to express themselves as individuals, with different concepts of
morality, within its integrated structure.
Appling this to the industry of pharmacy in society,
policymakers should allow pharmacists to be principled individuals
while effectively fulfilling a role of a professional in society.
Meanwhile, consumers should allow be allowed to have ideals while
expressing their collective role through their alliances with certain
businesses.
B. The Option to Wait
Therefore, to balance the role of a pharmacy to be driven
professionally and financially, to balance the role of a pharmacist to be
principled while being a professional and to balance the role of the
consumer to have ideals and impress them on society, the following
steps should be pursued by government. First, the legislators must
realize that sometimes the best strategy is the option to wait and do
nothing at least for the time being. In this case, wait for the market to
settle this dispute uninterrupted by government mandate. Although it is
a humble position for policy-makers to take, they must recognize that
government action is not a cure-all for all situations.
We recognize that some authors have argued this position is not
politically feasible or realistic. For example, Wilson succinctly
dismisses Vischer's market based argument on the grounds that it is not
a realistic approach given the tendency of legislatures to regulate this
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issue. The two fundamental problems Wilson sees with his argument is
that federal and state governments are already considering legislation
on both sides of issue and that policymakers are unlikely to let the
market contest occur on an issue that has built in urgency.' 53 Although
we appreciate her pragmatist perspective, she may have discounted a
market-based solution too quickly. Government actors would still be
responding to the problem to appease constituent's appetites for action
just in a more neutral way. Instead of playing the activist role of
choosing one side over the other, government actors would be active in
maintaining a mediator position through information sharing and
passive guidance of the affected parties.
Notably, just because government would take a more passive
role, does not mean it is any less important. It would simply mean that
the state would be one piece of the puzzle instead of painting the whole
picture by itself. The state's supporting role would include remaining
neutral in its regulation and encouraging the marketplace of ideas by
widening the avenues by which all the starring actors, such as the
pharmacies, pharmacists and consumers, may express themselves on
the issue. First, we will speak to the effects of remaining neutral and
then we will address some passive steps the state could take to
encourage an even playing field.
Remaining neutral would allow the starring actors the chance to
be heard in the marketplace. If the government were to take an active
stance on this issue, which as proven above necessarily means that it
must favor one side over the other, then the opportunity for individual
expression of morality and societal acceptance of morality has been
eliminated. Keep in mind that the free enterprise system that has
served America so well is based on the premise that business owners
are primarily profit driven. Although some may have moral
convictions that cause them to not sell in a given situation, as a whole
they are sufficiently inclined to sell products for which there is a
demand. When reasonable minds can differ, which is the case here,
then likely there are segments in society with opposing beliefs and
those with like beliefs will find each other in the marketplace.
Generally, business morals will align with employee and customer
ethics in order to be successful.
Then, consumers can speak to this issue by choosing to use the
drug, choosing not to, choosing to individually or collectively boycott a
pharmacy that sells emergency contraception or choosing to
153 Wilson, supra note 108, at 60.
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individually or collectively boycott one that does not. Pharmacists can
speak by choosing to fill emergency contraception prescriptions or not
or choose to work for an employer with policies for or against
emergency contraception. Physicians can speak by prescribing the
medication or by not suggesting it to consumers. However, the best
position for the government in this type of dilemma is not to speak and
let the marketplace of ideas do the talking.
C. Voluntary Increase of Emergency Contraception Avenues
One passive step the state could take, if necessary to increase
the avenues for individual expression on this issue, is to allow for more
voluntary distribution channels for the drug. Although applying
Tomkowiak's proposal for state and federal legislation and
pharmaceutical board regulation would render this part of her solution
useless, she does suggest some helpful ways to voluntarily increase
access to emergency contraception. For example, voluntary
collaborative practice agreements and exceptions for doctors to
dispense the drug directly if they so desire, would allow for more ways
consumers could receive emergency contraception from pharmacists or
doctors respectively. 154 In addition, now that the drug is over the
counter for most consumers, states could allow any business or
organization to carry the drug with the requirement that a licensed or
trained individual would only dispense the drug if the consumer
provided proof of age. In doing so, the government has increased
timely access to the drug but only through persons who support the use
of the drug.
Further, State Pharmacy Board websites could include a list of
approved reputable Plan B retailers with links to sites where the drug
could be purchased on-line or in the store. Since a vast majority of
Americans are connected to the internet in some capacity, women who
demand the drug could easily access their State's Plan B website to
retrieve this information on how to purchase the drug and the expected
timeframe and cost for delivery. If necessary, the state legislature
could mandate that this Plan B web address be posted or handed out at
all pharmacies that refuse to dispense the drug as well to insure that
women who are refused purchase of the drug would know alternative
location to obtain it.
154 Tomkowiak, supra note 2, at 1357.
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D. Information Requirements to Facilitate Marketplace of Ideas
Another passive step states could take to facilitate the free flow
of information on the topic is through notification policies. Pharmacies
and/or pharmacists could be required to inform the public of their
willingness or unwillingness to dispense the drug. This database could
be maintained by the state's pharmacy association and made available
to the public through local health departments, the association's
website, and/or posted at each pharmacy. It is also important to note
that the state should not interrupt the free flow of ideas by adverse
licensing and professional requirements for pharmacists who express
their unwillingness to dispense. Licensing of pharmacists should still
include the basic standards for competence, training, education,
sanitation, record-keeping etc. but a provision adding the sale of
particular drugs to these qualifications would not be necessary nor
appropriate under this government neutrality position.
IX. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we think that the marketplace of ideas should be
allowed to function on this issue. So long as consumers have access to
distribution channels for emergency contraception and to information
regarding where the drug is available, there is no reason why the
market would fail to reconcile this dilemma. However, if Wilson is
correct that governments will not be able to fight the urge to take an
active role in this dispute, then freedom of conscience should be the
paramount fundamental right. This determination is necessary to
provide the proper balance of rights because placing an affirmative
duty on pharmacists to dispense a drug negates the basic premises on
which our nation is built and only avoids a slight inconvenience to
consumers who desire emergency contraception. Finally, it is
important for governments to recognize that there are sound arguments
on both sides of this legal debate and that an in depth analysis of the
ethical and public policy ramifications of regulation on this issue is
absolutely necessary.
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